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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

UNAUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES
BY BONDHOLDERS' PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES
By

A

STANLEY LAW SABEL*

in a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review, in an
article entitled The Railroad Reorganization Act,1 has pointed
out that the problem of excessive reorganization expenses is not
satisfactorily settled even as to reorganizations of railroads under
that act.2 The act provides that a district court judge may within
WRITER

limits fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission ".

.

. allow

a reasonable compensation for the services rendered and reimburseinent for actual and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding and plan by officers, parties in interest, reorganization managers, and committees or other representatives of creditors and stockholders. . ... ,I

As pointed out

by Mr. Lowentha14 and by other writers on this act,' this section
does not change the law in relation to compensation of the committee and other expenses of a reorganization from what it was
under United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific
R. R. Co., 6 which held that the deposit contract in relation to

assessments was not a contract relating to commerce and hence
the Interstate Commerce Commission was without jurisdiction in
relation thereto.
It may be true, as Mr. Lowenthal suggests, that "even without the new act, the Supreme Court might conclude that devices
such as were employed in that case should not be permitted to
defeat commission regulation,"'7 or it may be, as suggested by
another writer, that the question now becomes one of the fairness
*Member of the New York Bar.
'Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, (1933) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 18.
-Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, (1933) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 18, 52-56.
347 Stat. at L. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. Supp. VII sec. 205 (1933).
(Italics ours.)
4Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, (1933) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 18, 52-56.
5
Rogers and Groom, Reorganization of R. R. Corporations under Sec.
77 of the Bankruptcy Act, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 571, 587-588.
1(1931)
282 U. S. 311, 51 Sup. Ct. 159, 75 L. Ed. 359.
7
Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, (1933) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 18, 55.
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of the plan.8 At any rate, the problem is certainly one of current
interest.
Although deposit agreements usually contain every conceivable
grant of power,9 and although the normal method of enforcement of assessments made by the committee is in rem against
the securities deposited, 10 it is conceivable that certain expenditures of the committee may be totally unauthorized by any construction of the deposit agreement and a depositing bondholder
may wish to raise this himself rather than wait and resist an
assessment. The bondholder may wish so to raise the issue in
order that he himself might select the time and place for the
suit. This special aspect of the problem raises the question of
what effect such expenditures would have on the relationship
between the committee and the depositors inter se. Along with
the broader problems, this certainly is not answered by the new
act. The whole question will without doubt be revisited in
litigation interpreting this act.'1 In anticipation of such litigation,
the present writer wishes to analyze the state of the authorities
as to the direct rights of the individual depositors as they are
affected by unauthorized expenditures by a protective committee.
ANALYSIS AND STATE OF AUTHORITIES

There appear to be no cases in which a bondholders' committee has been held directly liable to depositing members. Cases
which may be helpful on our problem fall roughly into two
groups: first, the group dealing with the nature of the relationship as it exists between the committee and the depositors; and,
second, the group involving equitable actions by the depositors
against the committee for an accounting. In this latter group
are a few cases dealing with the expenses incurred by the committee. None of these cases are specific or recent enough to
8
Weiner, Reorganization under Sec. 77: A Comment, (1933) 33 Col.
L. Rev. 834, 844.
9Address by Paul D. Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations, in
Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation
153, 164.
10 Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations, in Some Legal Phases of
Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation 153, 164; cf. Tillotson v. Independent Breweries Co., (1925) 216 Mo. App. 412, 268 S. W. 425.
"Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, (1933) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 18, 55, states, "Whatever the final decision may be, it is apparent
that there may be litigation before the provisions of the new Act on the
subject of fees can become effective."
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answer alone the problem as herein considered. It is believed,
however, that a tracing of the general proposition involved in
these two groups of cases will give a pretty close approximation
of the answer to our problem.
NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship existing between a depositor and the protective committee has been called one of trust1 2 agency,'" syndicate
or bailment. The conclusion reached by a recent writer as to
the nature of this relationship is that about all that can be said is
that it is contractual and fiduciary.14 An examination of the
cases is apt to leave one with an equally vague idea of just what
this relationship is. It is submitted, however, that a more definite
result can be reached. The confusion is due to the fact that the
depositing bondholders occupy a dual relationship with respect
to the committee, viz., they create the relationship and are, in
turn, the beneficiaries thereof. More generally speaking, they
are both grantors and cestuis; as grantors they create the relationship, and as cestuis they enforce it.
The contract of deposit in general determines the powers of
the protective committee. This is illustrated by Titus v. U. S.
Smelting, Refining and Mining Exploration Co.," where the court
examined the deposit agreement in reaching the conclusion that
"expenditures incurred to determine the presence or non-presence
of ore in paying quantities in a given mining area is [sic] necessary and proper work1 6and within the express authority conferred
upon the committee."
However, the contract of deposit is not always specific, and
in such cases the courts endeavor to construe the agreement. In
United Waterworks Co. v. Stone 7 the court sustained a declaration based upon conversion brought by certain bondholders against
a bondholders' committee, on the ground that the reorganization
plan alleged to have been adopted by the committee was not in
furtherance of the plan as outlined in the deposit agreement.
"2Caldwell v. City Water Supply Co., (1906) 130 Iowa 671, 105 N. W.
1016.

'"Millerv. Dodge, (1899) 28 Misc. Rep. 640, 59 N. Y. S. 107.
14Rogers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reorganization, (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 899, 928-929. See also, Rohlictn,
Protective Committees, (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 670, 682.
15(C.C.A. 2nd Cir., 1917) 240 Fed. 881.
:1(C.A.A. 2nd Cir., 1917) 240 Fed. 881, 891.
'z(D.C. Mass. 1904) 127 Fed. 587.

BONDHOLDERS' PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES

This case seems to indicate that the courts will construe deposit
agreements according to the purpose behind them. Thus it has
been held that where a depositor comes in under a subsequently
adopted reorganization plan, he cannot be held liable for expenses
incurred under a prior unsuccessful plan in which he had not
joined.' 8
In the case of expenditures by the committee, the usual form
of deposit agreement does not contain an express limitation upon
these expenditures. In such a case the right to make necessary
expenditures will be implied. Thus in Cowell v. City Water
Supply Co.19 the court said that ".

.

. any reasonable expenditure

necessary to preserve the property is implied in the very nature
of the trust." When a court reaches the point of interpreting a
deposit contract by the nature of the relationship, it is really
dealing with relational rather than contractual law. This fiduciary
relationship can be called a trust, at least as far as expenditures
by the fiduciary are concerned. So analyzed, the problem boils
down to a consideration of how the beneficiary can protect his
rights in the case of unauthorized expenditures by the fiduciary.
RIGHTS OF THE BONDHOLDERS

Rights and duties are correlative. Thus this topic, in considering the rights of bondholders, must also involve a consideration of the duties or limitations upon rights of the committee. In
general, a bondholders' committee has a lien upon the deposited
securities for expenses incurred in "good faith."' 2 1

Ordinarily, a

depositor who does not pay his pro rata share of the expenses
loses his right under the reorganization agreement and is only
22
entitled to his share of the proceeds from the foreclosure sale.
However, it has been suggested that under the modern type of
deposit agreement, providing for an in rem enforcement of the
assessment against the securities, such a failure to pay the assessment will not prevent the depositor sharing pro tanto in the new
corporation.23 Nevertheless, it is generally held that a depositor
'sVan Siclen v. Bartow, (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1899) 95 Fed. 793.

19(1906) 130 Iowa 671, 105 N. W. 1016.
20
Mfines Management Co. v. Close, (1919) 186 App. Div. 23, 174
N. Y.
2 S. 80.
'Coppell v. Hollins, (1895) 91 Hun 570, 36 N. Y. S. 500, aff'd on
opinion
22 below, (1899) 159 N. Y. 551, 54 N. E. 1089.
Appeal of Fidelity Insurance Co., (1884) 106 Pa. St. 144.
23
1ndiana Ill. & Iowa R. R. Co. v. Swannell, (1895) 157 Ill.
616, 41
N. E. 989.
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may, prior to the completion of a reorganization, bring an action
for an accounting without first paying his share of the reorganization expenses.

Thus Mawhitney v. Bliss2 4 held that a depositor

who alleged, among other things, excessive expenditures by the
committee as showing bad faith might obtain an accounting.
Similarly, the committee may have its accounts approved by a
court of equity. 21 This last case approved the expenditures by
the committee, although one of the members of the committee
was also a member of a firm to which commissions were paid for
the sale of bonds in the reorganized company.
From the foregoing it will be seen that a bondholder who does
not pay his share of the expenses of the committee will ordinarily
lose his rights (or at least pro tanto in the case of in rem enforcement) to share in the reorganized corporation. (The situation
where the reorganized company bears the expenses of the reorganization is not dealt with, as that involves more than the
relationship between the depositing bondholders and the committee. )26
Where the committee incurs excessive or unauthorized expenditures, it would seem that the rights of a bondholder should
be somewhat larger. That is, the committee, by over-assessing the
bondholder, should not prevent him from sharing in the reorganized company if he does not pay this assessment. As seen
in M4awhinney v. Bliss, 27 a bondholder may obtain an accounting,

by alleging bad faith of the committee, prior to the consummation
of the reorganization plan and although the deposit agreement
contained a provision limiting the duties of the committee to
account. However, the practical advantage of the solution just
suggested would be that the bondholder could wait and seek an
accounting after the reorganized company is formed, and thus
enforce his rights at a time when such a suit would be more fruitful. There seems to be but one case in which a bondholder
attempted to enforce his rights in this manner, Appeal of the
Fidelity Insurance Trust and Safe Deposit Co. 25

This case in-

volved a bill for accounting by certain bondholders against a bond24(1907) 117 App. Div. 255, 102 N. Y. S. 279, aff'd without opinion,
(1907) 189 N. Y. 501, 81 N. E. 1169.
5
2 Mills v. Potter, (1905) 189 Mass. 238, 75 N. E. 627.
26
See 15 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Private Corporations, rev. ed., 351.
27(1907) 117 App. Div. 255, 102 N. Y. S. 279, aff'd without opinion,
(1907) 189 N. Y. 501, 81 N. E. 1169.
28(1884) 106 Pa. St. 144.
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holders' committee. From a decree ordering an accounting, the
Although the appeal was
defendant bondholders appealed.
sustained, the peculiar set-up of this case involved a lower court
holding which is favorable to the view herein contended for, and
which was not weakened by the reversal on appeal. The decree
in the lower court was based on a master's report which it confirmed without opinion. The master found in favor of the
plaintiff under the following set-up: The deposit agreement
under which the plaintiff had deposited provided for the plaintiff
sharing in a reorganized company to be formed by the committee.
A foreclosure sale took place, and the property was bought by an
outsider, who later sold it to the persons who had agreed to act
as a bondholders' committee. The master found that this purchase
was in substance a purchase under the deposit agreement. He
next considered the objection urged by the committee that the
present plaintiff could not maintain his action because he had not
borne his proportionate share of the expenses. The master
decided that the action was not barred by the plaintiff's refusal
to share in the expenses, as certain expenses were excessive. On
this point the report of the case in the supreme court of Pennsylvania contained2 0 in its statement of facts the following quotation from the master's report:
" 'If the case turned upon this simple question [i.e., failure of
the plaintiff to share in the expenses], it would doubtless be necessary to dismiss the bill. There were, however, other circumstances to complicate the matter. After the purchase by the defendants, they dealt with the property as their own, without the
leave, assistance, or advice of the plaintiffs, or any of them. They
did more. They gave away, as a gratuity to Ogden, an integral
part of the property purchased for the joint benefit of the plaintiffs and defendants, to wit: that part of the value of the road
represented by the shares of stock issued by the reorganized railroad company, being all over $65,000, the amount of the mortgage
bonds issued by the company. If, for the sake of the argument,
we assume that this conduct was a fair compliance with the terms
of the agreement, it is still difficult to see how the defendants
could be entitled arbitrarily, and against the wishes of the plaintiffs, to spend $10,000 for improvements, and then to demand a
contribution including such expenditure on pain of a forfeiture
of the plaintiffs' rights under the agreement. The very foundation of the plaintiffs' duty to contribute was the fact of their
being jointly interested with the defendant, and the least right
29(1884) 106 Pa. St. 144.
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conferred by such joint interest was to be consulted as to the
propriety of spending money in improvements.' "
As before noted, the master's report was affirmed by the lower
court without opinion. Assuming that the reasoning of the
master's report was likewise adopted by this affirmance, the case
below stands for the proposition that excessive and unauthorized
expenses by a bondholders' committee will render the committee
liable to account to each bondholder for his pro rata share in the
reorganized company, although the bondholder has not yet paid
his share of the expenses of the committee. This probably does
not mean that the committee is thereby prevented from setting
off in such an action proper expenses; but it does mean that where
expenses are excessive, a depositing bondholder loses no rights
in the property or its proceeds by not paying the excessive assessment, and this although a lesser amount was justly due. The
reversal in the upper court was on the ground that the purchase
of the property by the bondholders' committee from the intermediate purchaser was not a purchase pursuant to the deposit
agreement, which limited the authorized bid to a lesser amount
than that paid to the intermediate purchaser. The upper court
thus held that the only duty the defendant owed to the plaintiff
was that which it owed to non-depositing bondholders, namely, to
offer him fair terms on which he could come in, and that having
refused such terms, he had no rights to participate in the reorganization other than those of a non-assenting bondholder. It
was thus unnecessary for the upper court to consider the propriety
of the expenses incurred by the committee.
Although this early holding of the master and the lower Pennsylvania court may be called weak authority, it suggests a simple
and practical means by which a bondholder can enforce his rights
in the case of excessive expenditures by a protective committee.
Yet to the reorganization lawyer it may suggest the necessity of
specifying in detail what expenditures may properly be incurred
by the committee which he represents. Like exculpatory clauses30
such specifications are not binding in every case, but like such
clauses these stipulations would probably govern in the ordinary
borderline case; that is, they would apply in the case in which
the principles suggested by the procedure in the lower Pennsylvania Court would open the way for the greatest opportunity for
3°See Posner, Liability of the Trustee under the Corporate Indenture,
(1928) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 198.
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holdups. When the cases are viewed in this light, one is less
willing to concede the desirability of attack by a single bondholder.
Theoretical jurisprudence does not always function so well in
these days of obstreperous minorities. 3'
31
The very theory underlying modem statutory schemes of reorganization is that of taking away too much power from the dissenter in cases
where a substantial majority favor a given plan.

